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Editor’s Note
Over recent years, a range of indicators and much anecdotal 
evidence  has  pointed  to  a  significant  increase  in  trading 
activity in the New Zealand dollar (NZD).  In the first article of 
this issue, Nick Smyth of the Financial Stability Department 
undertakes  an  in-depth  look  at  trends  in  New  Zealand’s 
foreign exchange (FX) market for the period from 2001 to 
2006.  He does so using data drawn from Spot Matching 
from Reuters, an electronic trade matching system used by 
the banks to trade the New Zealand dollar globally.  This 
system  tracks  trading  activity  in  real  time  and  in  many 
dimensions, providing a rich dataset for analysis.  We are 
grateful to Reuters for permission to use this data for the 
purposes of this article.
Nick’s article reveals a significant increase in trading volumes 
and a general increase in liquidity within the NZD market. 
Two case studies in the article demonstrate the speed with 
which  the  FX  market  is  able  to  absorb  and  reflect  new 
information in pricing as it comes to hand.   
In the second article, Andrew Coleman of the Economics 
Department  and  Brian  Silverstone  (University  of  Waikato 
and NZIER Research Associate) review research undertaken 
by central banks to try and understand firm-level pricing 
behaviour.    This  international  research  has  revealed 
considerable diversity in the way firms alter prices and has 
contemplated the driving factors behind those decisions. 
To date, little research has been done on this topic in New 
Zealand.  Using data drawn from the New Zealand Institute 
of Economic Research’s Quarterly Survey of Business Opinion, 
Andrew and Brian present some preliminary evidence, which 
appears broadly in line with the international studies.  New 
Zealand firms also appear to display considerable diversity 
in the frequency with which they adjust prices.  It appears 
firms tend to adjust prices more in response to cost changes 
than demand changes and prices appear to respond more in 
the face of negative demand changes than positive demand 
changes.    Andrew  and  Brian  indicate  a  range  of  future 
research possibilities in this area. 
In the third article, the Bank’s Legal Counsel, Nick McBride, 
briefly explores the concept of legal tender.  Although legal 
tender is a concept that few people actively contemplate 
when making transactions, Nick explains that without the 
safeguard of legal tender, cash transactions could not always 
take place with sufficient certainty to satisfy the needs of 
consumers and sellers.  Nick illustrates the concept with a 
few practical examples that draw on the experience of New 
Zealand’s recent change-over to new, lighter coins.
This is my last issue as editor of the Bulletin, having held 
the role for the past three years.  The new editor will be 
Tim Ng of the Bank’s Economics Department, who will take 
over the reins with the December 2007 issue.   I am sure Tim 
will continue to strive to make the Bulletin a useful source 
for  those  interested  in  topics  related  to  monetary  policy, 
financial stability and central banking in general.
Bernard Hodgetts
Editor
Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin
PO Box 2498
Wellington 6001
Telephone 64 4 471 3781
Facsimile 64 4 473 1209
Email hodgettsb@rbnz.govt.nz Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
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ARTICLES
A profile of the NZ dollar foreign exchange market1
























In recent years the New Zealand dollar (NZD) has attracted 
unprecedented  attention  in  the  global  financial  markets.   
There have been a number of reasons for this, including 
greater trading activity in the global foreign exchange (FX) 
market, and the relatively high level of New Zealand interest 
rates compared to some major overseas economies.  One 
well-publicised source of interest in the NZD has come from 
the  ‘carry  trade’,  a  practice  whereby  investors  borrow  in 
low yielding currencies, like the Japanese yen, and invest in 
higher yielding ones, such as the NZD.
A wide range of market participants are now increasingly 
active in the NZD market and follow New Zealand economic 
developments closely.  Of course, there has also been far 
greater public attention in New Zealand, as earlier this year 
the Reserve Bank intervened for the first time since the NZD 
floated back in 1985 (see figure 1 below), and the NZD rose 
to its highest level against the USD in 25 years.  
Despite the level of interest in the NZD over the past few 
years, it has been difficult for the Reserve Bank to gather 
precise information on trading activity.  Until recently, the 
Reserve Bank has had to rely on anecdotes from market 
participants  and  other  central  banks,  the  RBNZ  daily  FX 
turnover survey of the New Zealand-based banks, and the 
triennial  BIS  FX  turnover  survey,  as  its  major  sources  of 
information on trading activity in the NZD.2  However, the 
growth of electronic trading platforms in the FX market in 
recent years has now allowed us access to a far richer and 
more comprehensive set of information on the FX market.  
High-frequency  data  from  the  Reuters  Spot  Matching 
service, the main trading platform banks use to trade NZD 
with one another globally, gives us an opportunity to ‘look 
under the hood’ and update our understanding of the NZD 
market.  While the data is historical – meaning the Reserve 
Bank does not have access to the data in real time – it is still 
very useful to look back at past episodes and understand 
how the market dynamics worked at the time.  
In this article we review developments in the NZD/USD market between January 2001 and March 2006 using a new 
and detailed dataset from Reuters.  Given the traditionally opaque nature of the global FX market, the dataset provides 
some insights into the NZD/USD market that have previously been unavailable.  We show that trading volumes and other 
measures of market activity, like the depth of the limit order book, have increased significantly since 2001.  We also show 
that market activity changes at different times of the trading day, with considerably more trading volumes taking place 
in London and New York.  
  This article builds on some earlier work undertaken at 
the Reserve Bank by Wai Kin Choy and Victor Gaiduch.   
We would like to thank Reuters for access to the data and 
permission to publish it, and for other assistance.
  A forthcoming Bulletin article will discuss the results of 
the 007 BIS triennial FX turnover survey, which has 
detailed statistics on FX trading volumes worldwide.   Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
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The article proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we provide an 
overview of the global foreign exchange market.  In Section 
3, we discuss the Reuters Spot Matching service – the source 
of the data – and the main platform that banks use to trade 
NZD with one another globally.  In Section 4, we show how 
different indicators of trading activity in the NZD market, 
such as trading volumes, have changed between 2001 and 
mid-2006.  In Section 5, we look at how these indicators 
vary at different times of the trading day.  In Section 6, we 
look at how the NZD market reacts to new information, 
using the release of New Zealand retail sales in March 2006 
and 'September 11' as examples.  Finally, in Section 7 we 
conclude.  
2   The global foreign exchange 
market
The FX market is very large.  Average daily trading volumes 
in the spot FX market across all currencies were almost USD 
1.8 trillion in 2004 (BIS).3  To put this in context, average 
daily trading volumes on the New York Stock Exchange were 
88 billion USD and in US Treasury bonds were 700 billion 
USD in 2007.  A forthcoming article outlining the results to 
the 2007 Bank of International Settlements (BIS) FX turnover 
survey will provide a more recent update on global FX trading 
activity and the reasons for these developments.  
The  FX  market  is  made  up  of  many  different  types  of 
participants. These participants can be roughly broken down 
into: 
•  financial customers: participants such as hedge funds 
and pension funds who invest in financial assets, such 
as bonds and stocks, and speculate on the direction of 
currencies;
•  non-financial customers: participants such as exporters 
and importers who use the FX market to pay for goods 
and services;
•  dealers:  participants,  typically  working  as  traders  at 
banks, who intermediate between buyers and sellers, 
and sometimes trade for themselves.
In  2004,  trading  by  dealers  accounted  for  around  50 
percent of global FX turnover, trading by financial customers 
accounted  for  around  35  percent,  while  non-financial 
customers  accounted  for  the  remaining  15  percent  (BIS, 
2005).  Figure 2 below is a stylised view of the structure of 
the FX market.  
   The ‘spot’ FX market is what people usually refer to 
when they mention the FX market.  The ‘spot’ market is 
the main driver of movements in the exchange rate.  See 
Smyth (00) for information on the other FX markets, 
and Sager and Taylor (00) for a detailed explanation 
on the structure of the global spot FX market.7 Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
Figure 3 
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Visible to the market
Financial and non-financial customers buy and sell currencies 
directly with dealers at commercial banks.  Traditionally, this 
has occurred over the phone, but increasingly it now takes 
place via computer systems.  As dealers take the opposite 
side of customer trades, they accumulate currency positions 
over the trading day.  At some point, dealers ‘close out’ their 
positions by on-selling to dealers at other banks (trading 
between dealers occurs in what is known as the ‘interbank 
market’, as shown in figure 2).  Over the past few years, 
electronic broker systems have consolidated their position as 
the main mechanism by which dealers at banks trade with 
each other in all the major currencies, including the NZD.  
Often,  dealers  will  buy  or  sell  currencies  for  themselves 
for short periods, or decide to hold onto the positions for 
longer than usual, if they have a view on the likely direction 
of the exchange rate.  Dealers are quick to respond to new 
information,  such  as  the  release  of  economic  statistics, 
which influences the value of currencies.  Because dealers 
are typically the first to react to new information, it is in the 
interbank market – via the Spot Matching service – where 
much of the price discovery occurs in the FX market.  
3  The Reuters spot-matching 
system
In the NZD, the Reuters Spot Matching service is the dominant 
trading platform that banks use to trade with one another 
globally.  Discussions with market participants suggest that 
a  significant  proportion  –  perhaps  even  greater  than  90 
percent – of NZD trading between banks takes place over 
the Reuters system.  Since the interbank market is where 
customer flows are usually cleared, and where much of the 
price discovery takes place in the FX market, the Reuters 
dataset should provide a very representative view of global 
FX trading trends in the NZD.  
The Reuters system is an electronic limit order market, just 
like the trading platforms used to trade in many sharemarkets 
around the world (the difference being that an exchange 
rate is quoted in the FX market rather than a stock price in 
the sharemarkets).4  Like the sharemarket trading systems, 
dealers can trade in the Reuters system by leaving one of 
two types of orders – limit orders or market orders.  
A limit order is a commitment to buy (a bid) or sell (an offer) 
a specific quantity of currency at a chosen exchange rate.   
A collection of limit orders makes up what is known as the 
limit order book.  Figure 3 shows a subset of the limit order 
book at one point during 16 March 2006.  In this instance, 
one dealer has left a limit order to buy 4 million NZD against 
the USD at 0.6394.  When the dealer entered the order 
into the electronic broker, it did not result in an immediate 
trade, because there was no willing seller at this price.  The 
limit order stays in the system until either the dealer cancels 
the order, another dealer decides to sell to him at 0.6394, 
or until the order expires.5  Limit orders provide liquidity to 
the market, because they provide firm prices at which other 
dealers can trade on.  
   Here, the aim is to discuss the basic characteristics of 
the Reuters Spot Matching service, rather than provide 
a  very  detailed  description.    We  do  simplify  some  of 
the aspects of trading using the Reuters Spot Matching 
service.  A detailed description of the way the system 
works is available on the Reuters website.
   Limit  orders  automatically  expire  over  the  weekend, 
after pm New York time on Friday afternoon. 
A market order, in contrast, is an order to buy (a take) or sell 
(a hit) a given quantity immediately at the nearest exchange 
rate.  In figure 3, a dealer could sell 4 million NZD against 
the USD at 0.6394 immediately using a market order.  The 
advantage of using a market order is that the dealer can be 
certain he will complete a trade.  In contrast, a dealer who  Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
places a limit order cannot be certain that he will complete 
a trade because the exchange rate might well move in the 
opposite direction.6  
Figure 3 also illustrates the bid-offer spread, which is the 
difference between the lowest offer rate and the highest 
bid rate.  In this case, the bid-offer spread is 3 points (each 
‘point’ refers to 0.0001 USD).  Dealers can always see the 
lowest offer and the highest bid on their Reuters electronic 
broker screen, so dealers always know at what exchange 
rate they can trade immediately.  However, dealers (and the 
Reserve Bank) cannot see what bids and offers lie at other 
exchange rates.  That is, dealers cannot see the entire limit 
order book.7  In figure 3 for instance, dealers would not 
know that there were 25 million NZD of offers from 0.6398 
to 0.6403.
In the NZD/USD, the minimum trade size using the Reuters 
Spot Matching service is 1 million NZD.  Dealers can enter 
orders for much larger amounts than this, but for all limit 
orders  greater  than  10  million  NZD,  the  Reuters  system, 
perhaps  counter  intuitively,  displays  an  ‘R‘,  indicating  a 
‘regular’ trade size.  The market is able to see the volume 
attached  to  the  highest  bid  and  lowest  offer,  so  dealers 
have some idea how much they can trade at the nearest 
exchange rate.8  
When  a  trade  between  two  dealers  is  completed,  the 
Reuters Spot Matching service screen displays the price at 
which the transaction took place, and the direction of the 
aggressive, or incoming, order.9  An aggressive sell order 
is signalled by a ‘G‘ – which stands for ‘given‘ – while an 
aggressive buy order is signalled by a ‘P‘ – which stands for 
‘paid‘.  No information on the volumes of each transaction 
or the counterparties involved is made available to the rest 
of the market.  
4  Trends in the NZD market: 
January 2001 to March 2006
The  very  detailed  and  high-frequency  nature  of  data 
available from the Reuters Spot Matching service allows us 
to look at a range of indicators of market conditions in the 
NZD/USD.  Some of these indicators, such as the depth of 
the limit order book, have not been available until now for 
the global FX market.  These indicators provide a view of 
the liquidity of the market – that is, how easily and cheaply 
market participants can transact.10 
Transaction volumes
The number of transactions and the volumes traded in the 
NZD/USD over the Reuters Spot Matching service increased 
significantly between 2001 and 2006.  In 2001, transaction 
volumes averaged around 500 million NZD each day.  In 
March 2006, transaction volumes had increased to over 5.5 
billion NZD on an average day.  The forthcoming article on 
the triennial BIS FX turnover survey results will discuss some 
of the reasons for the growth in NZD trading.  
On some days, particularly large amounts were traded.  For 
example, on one day in January 2006 over 9 billion NZD was 
traded.  These volumes are substantial compared with both 
the size of the New Zealand economy and the volume of 
New Zealand exports and imports.  
   In actual fact, dealers tend to use limit orders aggressively 
to complete trades by entering an exchange rate that will 
guarantee a trade will take place.  For instance, in Figure 
, a dealer might leave an offer for 0 million NZD at 
0.9.    This  would  complete  a  trade  for    million 
immediately, while the remaining  million NZD would 
become the best (lowest) offer in the market at 0.9.  
7   In contrast, most sharemarkets make information on the 
entire limit order book available in real time.  
   The Reuters electronic broker allows dealers to enter a 
‘more quantity’ option.  Dealers can enter a limit order 
that displays only a portion of the total amount to the 
market – i.e. a dealer could submit an order to buy  
million NZD with a ‘more quantity’ option for 9 million 
at 0.7000.  The market would only see  million NZD 
displayed on the screen, not the 9 million NZD that is 
also in the limit order book.  
9  Another way of describing an aggressive order is as an 
order that is entered into the system that immediately 
results in a trade - this can be either a market order or 
a limit order that is entered at the same price as the best 
opposing order in the limit order book.  
0   The semi-annual Financial Stability Report has a Financial 
Markets section that usually includes the Reserve Bank’s 
assessment of liquidity in the NZD/USD market.  The 
most recent Report is available on the Bank’s website.   
A description of the different indicators of liquidity in 
the  NZD/USD  market  is  contained  in  a  00  Bulletin 
article  by  Lauren  Rosborough.    Readers  can  refer  to 
a  BIS  paper  on  market  liquidity  in  999  for  a  more 
comprehensive  discussion  of  the  various  elements  of 
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Figure 4 























Number of trades Number of trades
Note: Order book ‘snapshots’ are taken every five minutes 
and the number and volume of orders are recorded.  The 
averages are then worked out for each month.  
Source: Reuters
Figure 6 
Average volumes of bids and offers in the NZD/
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It is worth keeping in mind that the large increase in trading 
volumes in the NZD as captured by our data is partly due to 
the growth of electronic brokers as trading platforms.  In 
2001, the Reuters electronic broker was not used by banks 
to trade NZD with one another to the extent that it is now.   
However, even accounting for greater use of the Reuters 
Spot  Matching  service  in  the  NZD  market,  NZD  volumes 
globally  appear  to  have  increased  substantially  between 
2001  and  2006,  reflecting  greater  interest  in  the  New 
Zealand economy and New Zealand financial markets.
The depth of the limit order book
The volume of orders in the limit order book also increased 
between 2001 and 2006.  In March 2006, there were, on 
average, around 60 million NZD of offers and 75 million NZD 
of bids in the electronic broker continuously during the day.   
Dealers prefer when there are substantial limit orders in the 
market, because it means there are a number of different 
banks willing to take the opposite side of the trade with 
them.  A deep limit order book gives dealers the ability to 
buy and sell large amounts immediately if they need to, and 
is a sign of a well-functioning and liquid market.   
Dealers also prefer when limit orders are clustered close to 
the current market exchange rate, because it means they 
can trade immediately at a competitive price.  For instance, 
in  figure  3  a  dealer  who  wanted  to  buy  4  million  NZD 
immediately would have had to pay 0.6397 for 1 million, 
0.6398 for 1 million, and 0.6399 for 2 million – a dealer 
would prefer that there was an offer for 4 million (or a larger 
amount  depending  on  how  much  he  wanted  to  buy)  at 
0.6397 because it would make it cheaper for him to buy 
NZD.  
Figure 7 shows the volume of limit buy orders by how close 
they are to the highest bid rate while figure 8 shows the 
volume of limit sell orders by how close they are to the 0 Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
Figure 7 
Average volume of bids in the limit order book 
Figure 8 
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Figure 9 
Average and median bid-offer spread in the 
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lowest offer rate.  The volume of orders close to the best 
market rates – such as those within 2 points of the best bid 
or offer – increased between 2001 and 2006, a sign that 
liquidity in the NZD market has improved and dealers can 
transact more cheaply.  However, the bulk of orders in the 
limit order book remained concentrated well away from the 
best bid and offer. 
The bid-offer spread
The bid-offer spread (or bid-ask spread) is the difference 
between  the  highest  bid  rate  and  the  lowest  offer  rate.   
When there is a narrow bid-offer spread, dealers can trade 
immediately at a rate close to the ‘market’ exchange rate, 
effectively making it cheaper for them to transact.11  The 
  In addition, when the bid-offer spread is narrow, there 
is less confusion about where the market exchange rate 
lies.   During periods when the bid-offer spread is wide, 
it  can  be  difficult  to  tell  where  within  the  spread  the 
market exchange rate lies.  This in turn makes it difficult 
for dealers to quote customers a fair exchange rate to 
transact on.  
median  bid-offer  spread  in  the  Reuters  electronic  broker 
narrowed between 2001 and 2006, from around 5-6 points 
towards  the  start  of  the  period  to  around  2-3  points  in 
March 2006, another sign that conditions in the NZD market 
have improved.  
5  Trends in the NZD market 
across the trading day
Transaction volumes
Transaction volumes have two distinct peaks over the trading 
day – the first after London opens for the day and a second, 
larger peak towards the London ‘fix’ (see box 1).  There is a 
dip during the middle of the London trading session, which 
probably reflects the lunchtime for dealers and other market 
participants.  
Volumes in the NZD/USD tend to be much higher during 
offshore trading – particularly so in London and New York 
– where most of the major financial participants are based.   
Volumes  are  significantly  lower  during  the  New  Zealand 
trading  day,  particularly  in  the  period  after  New  York 
closes for the day, and before Singapore and Tokyo open.   
Nonetheless,  trading  volumes  in  the  NZD/USD  have  still 
increased substantially over the New Zealand trading day.   
The trading patterns in the NZD/USD over the trading day 
Note: ‘Snapshots’ of the bid-offer spread are taken every 
five minutes.  The median bid-offer spread is taken as 
the median observation of all the recordings over the 
month.  
Source: Reuters Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
Figure 11 
































Different time-zones during New Zealand 
winter months












FX trading in different time-zones
The FX market is a 24-hour global market with trading 
activity switching from one trading centre to another as 
the day wears on.  The trading week begins at 5am Sydney 
time  on  Monday  morning  and  continues  uninterrupted 
until 5pm New York time on Friday evening.  Global banks 
tend to pass their customer orders onto the trading desk 
at  the  next  time-zone  at  the  completion  of  their  local 
business day.  
The major time-zones are:
•  The  Asian  time-zone:  the  major  trading  centre  is 
Tokyo, but other important regional trading centres 
include Singapore, Sydney and Hong Kong.   
•  The European time-zone: the major trading centre is 
London, with other regional trading centres including 
Frankfurt, Zurich and Paris.
•  The American time-zone: the major trading centre is 
New York, with Toronto being the other significant 
regional trading centre. 
Figure  10  shows  when  the  major  trading  centres  are 
open over the trading day during the New Zealand winter 
months  (the  opening  and  closing  hours  for  different 
trading centres in GMT change slightly during the New 
Zealand summer months).  The largest trading centre for 
FX has been London for some time, followed by New York, 
and then Tokyo.  There is often overlap when two major 
trading centres are open for operation at the same time.  
The busiest period in the trading day occurs around the 
London ‘fix’ – at 4pm London time – when the London and 
New York markets are both open.  The exchange rates at 
the time of the London ‘fix’ are often used as the reference 
rates  for  global  fund  managers  and  for  some  financial 
contracts.  Market participants, knowing there will usually 
be heavy trading activity over this period, often choose this 
time of the day if they need to trade large amounts.  
are very similar to those for most major currencies that are 
traded globally, including the Australian dollar (AUD/USD).  
The average number of transactions has an almost identical 
pattern to the volume of transactions over the trading day.   
The average number of transactions in an hour tends to 
peak around the time of the London fix.  In 2006, there 
were around 225 transactions on average in the hour of 
the London fix.  In comparison, the number of transactions 
over the New Zealand morning session averaged around 75 
transactions in 2006.   Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
The depth of the limit order book
The limit order book also tends to be deepest – in that there 
are usually the most orders in the limit order book – during 
the offshore sessions, particularly so around the time of the 
London fix.  The volume of bids averaged around 70 million 
around the time of the London fix in 2006, while the volume 
of offers averaged around 65 million.  At quieter times of the 
day, such as the period before London opens and the period 
before Tokyo opens, the volume of outstanding orders was 
somewhat less.  
The bid-offer spread
The  bid-offer  spread  tends  to  be  narrowest  during  the 
London  and  New  York  trading  sessions.    In  2001,  the 
median bid-offer spread was around 7-9 points during the 
New Zealand morning session and around 4-5 points over 
the remainder of the trading day.  In 2006, bid-offer spreads 
had narrowed significantly and were relatively stable across 
the trading day – the median bid-offer spread was usually 
between 2–3 points over the trading day.  
Figure 12 
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Figure 14 
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Figure 15 

































Source: Reuters Source: Reuters Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
The trading range
The  trading  range  is  the  difference  between  the  highest 
traded price and the lowest traded price over a specified 
period.  The hourly trading range tends to be wider during 
the  London  and  New  York  sessions,  where  most  of  the 
trading is concentrated.  Most major market moving events, 
such as the regular releases of US and European economic 
statistics, take place during the offshore sessions and can 
cause large price movements in the major exchange rates.   
While  the  NZD/USD  can  move  significantly  after  New 
Zealand monetary policy announcements and New Zealand 
economic data, movements in the NZD/USD, on average, 
tend to be fairly subdued during the New Zealand trading 
day.  
The September 11 attacks
The attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon 
took  place  on  the  morning  of  11  September  2001  New 
York time.  A plane struck the World Trade Centre at around 
8:46am New York time (12:46 GMT), and two further attacks 
took place over the next hour (a second plane struck the 
World Trade Centre at around 13:03 GMT and a third plane 
struck the Pentagon at around 13:37 GMT).  The timings 
of the three attacks are highlighted by the dashed lines in 
figures 17 to 21.  
In the minutes following each attack, the NZD/USD increased 
slightly, although it is difficult to determine whether this 
was  a  direct  response  to  the  attacks.    It  took  time  for 
news agencies to report on the attacks and longer still to 
confirm that terrorists were behind the plot, so there was 
considerable uncertainty in the market during this period.  
Once people became aware of the seriousness of the attacks, 
the  market’s  response  was  to  sell  the  USD,  presumably 
because the market (on balance) believed that the economic 
implications of the attacks would be worse for the US than 
other countries, including New Zealand.  Three hours after 
the  first  attack  had  taken  place  the  NZD/USD  had  risen 
almost 80 points, or close to 2 percent.12
Figure 16
Average hourly trading range in the NZD/USD 
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6  Two case studies: September 
11 and the February 2006 retail 
sales release
The FX market incorporates new information into exchange 
rates very quickly.  Dealers are quick to react to the release 
of information that affects the perceived value of currencies, 
and they trade accordingly.  Here we look at the reaction of 
the NZD market to two interesting events – the attacks on 
the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on 11 September 11 
2001 and the release of NZ retail sales on 14 March 2006.   
One of the very appealing features of the data from the 
Reuters Spot Matching service is that it is very high frequency, 
so we can look at how the market dynamics evolved second-
by-second around the time of these events.  
Figure 17 
NZD/USD and trading volumes around the 
September 11 attacks
    It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  the  days  following  the 
attacks,  the  NZD/USD  started  weakening,  as  market 
participants came around to the view that it was safer to 
have money in the US than in smaller economies, such as 
New Zealand, in such uncertain times.  
Source: Reuters
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Trading  volumes  were  relatively  small  in  the  hour  after 
the first attack, but increased somewhat after the attacks 
became widely reported.  NZD 138 million was traded in the 
three hours after the first attack, around the average trading 
volume in 2001 and 2002 over this time of the day.  Figure 
17 shows the trading volumes minute-by-minute over the 
three hour period.  
Figure 18 shows the cumulative NZD/USD ‘order flow’ over 
the three-hour period.  Order flow is the total volume of 
aggressive buy orders less the total volume of aggressive sell 
orders.13  Order flow effectively measures the net buying or 
selling pressure in the market.  Positive order flow indicates 
there is net buying pressure in the market, whereas negative 
order flow indicates there is net selling pressure.  Over the 
three-hour period after the first attack, dealers aggressively 
bought the NZD/USD, causing the NZD/USD to appreciate.14   
Cumulative order flow for the three-hour period was around 
60 million NZD.  
attacks.  Soon after the second attack took place, the bid-
offer spread widened from around 20 points to almost 60 
points.  The bid-offer spread usually widens during times of 
uncertainty, as dealers do not want to commit to buying or 
selling large amounts in potentially volatile circumstances.   
The bid-offer spread returned to more normal levels around 
two hours after the first attack.  
Figure 18 
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On several occasions in the hours following the first attack, 
the bid-offer spread widened significantly as dealers cancelled 
their limit orders and waited to determine the severity of the 
Figure 19
The Bid-offer spread around the September 11 
attacks
Note: The spread is taken every five minutes when ‘snapshots’ 
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Figure 20 
The depth of the limit order book around the 
September 11 attacks
Note:  The  volume  of  bids  and  offers  is  recorded  every 





















   As mentioned in Section , an aggressive order is any 
order that once entered into the Reuters system results in 
an immediate trade being completed.  This can be either 
a market order, or a limit order entered at the same price 
as the best opposing limit order in the limit order book.  
  There is now a substantial literature on the link between 
order flow and exchange rate changes.  See Osler (00) 
for a recent review of the literature or Lyons (00) for a 
more comprehensive review. 
For the most part, the limit order book was skewed towards 
buyers,  and  at  times  there  were  almost  no  offers  in  the 
market (see figures 20 and 21).  After the second attack, 
the limit order book became thinner as dealers cancelled 
existing orders and were hesitant about entering new orders 
Source: Reuters
Source: Reuters
Source: Reuters Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
in such an uncertain environment.  Dealers started entering 
more limit orders around two hours after the first attack, 
and the order book became more balanced between bids 
and offers.  
September 11 provides an interesting case study into the 
dynamics of the NZD market around a period of significant 
uncertainty.    As  news  of  the  attacks  became  public,  the 
liquidity  in  the  market  decreased  –  the  limit  order  book 
became shallower (meaning dealers could not buy or sell 
as much as before), the bid-offer spread widened, and the 
exchange rate became volatile (increasing almost 2 percent 
in under three hours).  The liquidity in the market appeared 
to return to more normal levels several hours after the initial 
attacks.  
The release of New Zealand retail sales – 14 
March 2006
Economic statistics – such as GDP and CPI –  are an important 
determinant  of  exchange  rates.    Market  participants  pay 
close attention to the release of economic statistics, and 
often revise their views on the exchange rate if the statistics 
are well away from their expectations.  The release of New 
Zealand’s retail sales in March 2006 provides an interesting 
example.    In  early  2006,  a  series  of  weak  New  Zealand 
economic statistics had led the market to anticipate interest 
rate  cuts  by  the  Reserve  Bank.    Dealers  were  watching 
the release closely to see whether it would confirm some 
commentators’ views that the economy was about to slow 
sharply.  
On  14  March  at  10:45am  NZT  (13  March,  21:45  GMT) 
Statistics New Zealand announced that retail sales were ‘flat’ 
(unchanged)  between  January  and  February  2006,  much 
lower than what economists were expecting (the median 
economist estimate was +0.5 percent).  Following on from 
a  ‘flat’  retail  sales  release  the  previous  month  and  other 
indicators that suggested the New Zealand economy was 
slowing considerably, markets moved to anticipate further 
interest rate cuts by the Reserve Bank. The NZD/USD fell 
around 35 points (or just over 0.5 percent) immediately after 
the release, as dealers reacted to the lower than expected 
headline number.  
Trading volumes were relatively small in the hour leading up 
to the release.  However, once the data was released, trading 
activity increased substantially, with some very large trades 
taking place.  Almost 450 million NZD was traded in a one 
minute period after the release, much higher than usual.  
Figure 21 
The net difference between the volume of bids 























NZD/USD and trading volumes around the retail 
sales release
Cumulative  order  flow  was  around  -1  billion  NZD  in  the 
hour following the retail sales release, meaning dealers were 
large aggressive sellers of the NZD/USD. Dealers determined 
that the economy was not as strong as they had expected 
and that the Reserve Bank might have to cut interest rates 
sooner than they had anticipated, and they subsequently 
sold the NZD aggressively.  The aggressive selling occurred in 
two main ‘waves’ – first, straight after the release, and then 
again around 30 minutes later.  This corresponded with the 
NZD/USD falling around 80 points (just over one percent) 
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Figure 24 shows the bid-offer spread around the release.   
The  spread  widened  just  before  the  release  as  dealers 
withdrew their limit orders.  Dealers who leave limit orders 
in  the  market  over  data  releases  risk  buying  or  selling 
at  unfavourable  exchange  rates,  so  they  often  prefer  to 
cancel their limit orders beforehand and then re-enter them 
afterwards.  While the spread spiked a little wider on a few 
occasions over the hour following the release, for the most 
part it was reasonably stable around 2 points.  
An hour before the retail sales release, the limit order book 
was very deep and skewed towards buyers, suggesting there 
was good underlying demand for the NZD (the NZD/USD 
was increasing prior to the data release, and dealers may 
have been looking to buy at lower levels).  However, dealers 
withdrew their orders just prior to the data release – as noted 
above, this caused the bid-offer spread to widen.  
After  the  data  release,  a  number  of  limit  orders  were 
resubmitted  –  including  two  substantial  bids.    However, 
aggressive selling by other dealers eliminated these bids, and 
the order book switched to being skewed towards sellers 
(there were more offers in the market than there were bids).   
The volume of orders in the limit order book around the 
retail sales release was reasonably substantial compared to 
average.  
Figure 23 





















The bid-offer spread around the retail sales 
release
Note: The spread is taken every five minutes when ‘snapshots’ 
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Figure 25 
The depth of the limit order book after the 
retail sales release
Figure 26 
The net difference between the volume of bids 
and offers after the retail sales release
Note:  the  volume  of  bids  and  offers  is  recorded  every 
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The February retail sales release provides an insight into how 
the market reacts to scheduled releases.  The exchange rate 
is very quick to incorporate new information – the exchange 
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fall over the following hour as market participants took time 
to determine the full implications of the release for the New 
Zealand economy.  Trading activity fell away just before the 
release, but picked up again noticeably afterwards.  Trading 
volumes were particularly heavy at times and the order book 
was sometimes full of several large limit orders.  
7  Conclusion
From the Reserve Bank’s perspective, we have an obvious 
interest in the FX market.  A well functioning FX market is 
crucial to New Zealand as a small open economy.  Importers 
and exporters rely on the FX market to make and receive 
payments  for  their  goods  and  services,  while  some 
businesses borrow and lend money overseas.  The Reserve 
Bank actively monitors conditions in the NZD market, and 
maintains  a  capacity  to  intervene  in  the  FX  market  for 
monetary policy purposes and in the event that the market 
becomes disorderly.  
Data  from  Spot  Matching  at  Reuters  allows  us  to  take 
a  detailed  look  back  at  how  the  interbank  NZD  market 
functioned  between  2001  and  2006.    While  the  data  is 
historical, there are some clear trading patterns at different 
times of the day evident between 2001 and 2006 that are 
still the case today.  
Most  trading  in  the  NZD/USD  takes  place  in  offshore 
markets, particularly in London, the major centre for foreign 
exchange globally.  Trading volumes are around two-to-four 
times higher in London, the order book is generally deeper, 
and bid-offer spreads tend to be narrower, reflecting the 
wide range of active market participants who trade during 
the London timezone.  
Across a broad range of indicators from the Reuters electronic 
broker, trading activity has picked up and the liquidity of 
the  NZD  market  has  increased  over  the  past  few  years.   
Transaction volumes have increased, the limit order book 
has become deeper, and bid-offer spreads have narrowed, 
making trading generally easier and cheaper for dealers in 
the interbank market. This is consistent with anecdotes and 
other partial indicators that suggest there has been a much 
higher interest in trading the NZD in recent years.  
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1  Introduction
A  central  focus  of  monetary  economics  is  the  frequency 
with which firms change prices. Beginning with David Hume 
(1752), it has long been argued that the speed that firms 
change  prices  determines  the  extent  that  fluctuations  in 
the demand for goods and services lead to fluctuations in 
output rather than fluctuations in prices. When prices are 
inflexible, sticky or sluggish, a disproportionate fraction of 
the adjustment to economic shocks takes place as changes 
in firms’ production, employment and capacity utilisation 
rather than in their prices. In turn, sluggish price adjustment 
makes the implementation of monetary policy more difficult, 
not only because there can be long lags between monetary 
policy changes and prices changes, but also because the 
resultant fluctuation in output levels can be costly. 
In the last decade, researchers in many countries have used 
new  data  sources  to  examine  the  frequency  with  which 
firms adjust prices. Some of this research has been based 
on detailed surveys of firm behaviour and some has been 
based  on  data  collected  by  national  statistical  agencies.   
A  clear  picture  has  started  to  emerge.  It  is  a  picture  of 
considerable diversity. At one extreme, a small fraction of 
firms appear to adjust their prices on a weekly basis. At the 
other extreme, a sizeable fraction of firms adjust their prices 
less than once every two years. In between, there are firms 
that adjust on a regular calendar cycle, often in January, and 
firms that adjust only when they are affected by a shock 
to their cost structure.  There are firms that think nothing 
of having sales or specials every few weeks, and firms that 
agonise over every price change, often dispatching senior 
company personnel to customers to explain why a change 
was necessary (Zbaracki et  al.  2004). 
In conjunction with this work, there is new evidence that 
differences  in  the  frequency  with  which  firms  change 
prices are important for monetary policy.  Recent analysis 
of United States data has indicated that when monetary 
policy is tightened the size of a sector’s output decline is 
inversely related to the frequency of price changes in that 
sector. Sectors that receive more sector-specific shocks tend 
to change prices more frequently, are faster to alter prices in 
response to monetary policy changes and have less output 
change when monetary policy is altered (Boivon, Giannoni 
and Mihov 2007).  
In this article, we provide some evidence on the frequency 
with which New Zealand firms change prices. The evidence is 
Price changes by firms in New Zealand – some evidence 
from the Quarterly Survey of Business Opinion1
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   Access to the data used in this study was provided by 
the  NZIER  under  conditions  that  maintained  the  full 
confidentiality  of  respondent  firms.    The  authors  are 
grateful to the Institute and to its Chief Executive, Dr 
Brent Layton, for access to this data.  The authors also 
thank Phil Briggs, Bob Buckle and the participants at 
a Reserve Bank seminar.  The study was supported by 
Bank funding and by University of Waikato Research 
Grant  X.    The  results  and  views  presented  are 
the work of the authors and not the Reserve Bank or 
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from the Quarterly Survey of Business Opinion (QSBO).  This 
is a survey of firms in the manufacturing, building, merchant 
and service sectors published by the New Zealand Institute 
of Economic Research (NZIER). Since 1961, when it was first 
conducted, it has been an important source of information 
about New Zealand firms (see Box 1, overleaf).  Consistent 
with  the  international  evidence,  we  find  considerable 
diversity in the frequency with which firms adjust prices. 
While many New Zealand firms adjust prices nearly every 
quarter, there are a significant number of firms that adjust 
prices infrequently, at most once every two years. In addition, 
the data indicate that the speed that firms adjust prices in 
response  to  demand  and  cost  pressures  is  systematically 
related to their previous pattern of price adjustment. 
The next section is a brief overview of the major themes 
and results on price-setting behaviour that have emerged 
from international research using business surveys.  This is 
followed by a range of empirical questions regarding price 
changes in New Zealand using firm-level data from QSBO.     
The final sections contain our conclusions and directions for 
further research.
2   Major themes and 
international results
Recent  research  on  the  way  that  firms  adjust  prices  can 
largely  be  traced  to  the  contributions  by  Okun  (1981), 
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986), Blinder (1991) and, 
somewhat further back, to Hall and Hitch (1939). 
Okun (1981) developed a theory of firm price adjustment 
based on the idea of ‘costly search’.  He argued that it is 
costly for customers to search for firms that provide good 
quality products at good prices on a reliable and timely basis. 
Once a customer finds such firms, he or she stays with them 
with the result that customers and firms form long-term 
relationships. Firms only change prices in a manner that does 
not harm these relationships.  In particular, Okun hypothesized 
that firms are reluctant to raise prices in response to demand 
shocks for fear of alienating customers.
Kahneman et al. (1986) surveyed people about their views 
on when it is acceptable for firms to change prices. The 
responses showed that a large majority of people thought 
it was fair for firms to raise prices when costs increased, 
although they did not mind if prices were not cut when 
costs  declined.  People  also  thought  it  was  acceptable  to 
cut prices when demand was low, although unfair for firms 
to raise prices above normal when demand was high. The 
authors argued that firms would act accordingly, so that 
asymmetric responses to demand and cost shocks should 
be observable. 
Blinder (1991) and his team (Blinder et al. 1998) conducted 
intensive interviews of a large number of United States firms 
regarding their pricing behaviour.2  The team asked a wide 
range of questions such as:  How often do firms change 
their prices? How do firms respond to cost and demand 
changes?  Do  firms  set  prices  according  to  the  textbook 
theories of price stickiness? The answers were sufficiently 
groundbreaking  that  surveys  into  price  setting  behaviour 
have now been conducted in several other countries, often 
by  central  banks.  In  addition,  researchers  in  Europe  and 
North America have examined firm level price data provided 
to national statistical agencies to see how frequently firms 
changed retail and wholesale prices.
The  results  of  this  research  have  shed  light  on  both  the 
frequency with which firms change prices and the reasons 
why they change prices. Turning first to the frequency of 
price changes, a standard finding is that some firms change 
prices very frequently but a significant number only change 
them occasionally. Blinder found that 10 percent of United 
States firms changed prices once a week, but 50 percent 
of firms changed prices at most once a year. Subsequent 
research suggests that 25-30 percent of firms in the United 
States  change  prices  every  month,  while  the  average 
duration between price changes is six or seven months (Bils 
and Klenow, 2004; Klenow and Kryvstov, 2005). European 
consumer prices seem to be stickier. Surveys across European 
countries  suggest  approximately  15  percent  of  consumer 
prices are changed every month, while the average duration 
   Prior to Blinder, mainstream economists were skeptical 
at best, and hostile at worst, to the use of firm-level survey 
and interview data.  “We are trained to study behaviour 
by watching what people do (usually in markets), not by 
listening to what they say” (Blinder 99, p.90).   Due 
to the success of this survey, this situation is changing 
rapidly.  0 Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
Box 1
The  New  Zealand  Institute  of  Economics  Research 
(NZIER) has, since 1961, published a Quarterly Survey of 
Business Opinion (QSBO). The survey covers firms in the 
manufacturing,  building,  merchant  and  service  sectors 
(with primary industries, utilities and government services 
the main omissions). It has long been an important source 
of  forecasting  and  monitoring  information  and  data 
for  economic  research.    (On  the  latter,  see  Buckle  and 
Silverstone 2004).
Almost all questions in QSBO are related to the experiences 
and  outlook  of  respondent  firms  regarding  profitability, 
output,  employment,  investment  intentions,  costs, 
prices and similar variables.  Table 1 shows most of the 
questions common to all sectors together with the June 
quarter 2007 responses.  These aggregated responses are 
published in QSBO as net balances, that is, the difference 
between the percentage replying ‘up’ and the percentage 
replying ‘down’.  In table 1, for example, a net 37 percent 
of respondents expect the general business situation over 
the six months to December 2007 to deteriorate.  The net 
balances, in turn, are often compared in QSBO with their 
underlying official statistics, such as GDP and the producer 
and consumer price indices. Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
between price changes was just over a year. (Dhyne et al. 
2006).  
Second, the research has also examined the reasons why 
firms  change  prices.  Following  Blinder,  firms  have  been 
provided with a list of a dozen or so reasons why they do 
not change prices more frequently, and asked to rank their 
importance.  The  top  five  explanations  in  Blinder’s  survey 
were:
•  Firms hesitate to raise prices in case their competitors 
will not follow (co-ordination failure).
•  Firms  change  prices,  with  a  lag,  to  changes  in  costs 
(cost-based pricing).
•  Firms  change  non-price  features,  such  as varying the 
quality of service (non-price competition).
•  Firms  have  an  implicit  understanding  with  their 
customers not to increase prices when supplies are tight, 
unless justified by higher costs (implicit contracts).
•  Firms  have  written  contracts  which  usually  make  it 
difficult  to  change  prices  within  the  contract  period 
(explicit contracts). 
A full ranking of the explanations is shown in table 2, overleaf, 
along with the ranking of firms in the United Kingdom, the 
Euro area, Canada and Sweden.  As can be seen, firms in 
each country had substantially similar rankings.  In general, 
the surveys support the argument that firms change prices 
more in response to cost changes than demand changes. 
The  research  has  generated  many  other  findings.  The 
following  list,  based  on  Fabiani  et  al.  (2007  p7-8,  47), 
summarises the research conducted in most of the Euro area 
countries by the Eurosystem central banks. These results are 
similar to those from other countries. 
•  The frequency of price changes varies considerably from 
firm to firm.
•  The  average  frequency  of  price  changes  varies  by 
sector.
•  Energy sector firms change prices more frequently than 
other firms. 
•  Firms that use a lot of raw materials change prices more 
frequently than firms that use few raw materials.
•  Firms that are labour intensive, particularly in the service 
sectors, change prices less frequently than others.  
•  Firms in the Euro area change their prices less frequently 
than those in the United States.
•  There is little evidence of downward price rigidity, except 
in the services sector.
•  Price-setting responds asymmetrically to factors such as 
changes to cost and demand.
•  The dominant approach to price setting is for firms to 
mark up prices over costs. 
3   New Zealand evidence from 
the Quarterly Survey of 
Business Opinion 
The analysis of the QSBO survey is presented as a series of 
questions and answers.  Most of the analysis is based on 
firms’ response to a question asking whether their selling 
price had decreased, stayed the same, or increased in the 
previous three months.  Since firms often sell more than one 
item, the question is normally interpreted to refer to the 
selling price of the firm’s main product. The firms are also 
asked whether their costs or sales changed over the previous 
three months (see box 1).
Question  1:  What  fraction  of  firms  change  prices 
each quarter?
Figure 1, overleaf, shows the fraction of firms that claimed 
they had changed their selling prices in the previous quarter. 
The  figure  shows  the  fraction  that  either  increased  or 
decreased prices and the fraction that just decreased prices. 
Two  points  stand  out.  First,  the  fraction  changing  prices 
depends  on  the  inflation  rate.  Prior  to  1987,  when  the 
inflation rate was high, around two thirds of firms changed 
prices in a quarter. Since 1990, when the inflation rate has  Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3 Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
been  low,  only  40  percent  of  firms  have  changed  prices 
in a quarter.3  Second, a much greater proportion of firms 
increased prices than decreased prices.  Price decreases were 
rare in the high inflation period before 1987.  Even when the 
inflation rate has been low, only a small proportion of firms 
have decreased prices, except during the 1991 and 1998 
economic downturns. Since 2000 the average number of 
firms that have reduced prices has only been 10 percent per 
quarter, a third of the number of firms that have increased 
prices. 
Question  2:  What  fraction  of  firms  change  prices 
over two quarters?
Further insight into the frequency of price changes can be 
gained  by  examining  the  fraction  of  firms  that  changed 
prices at least once over a six month period.  To do this, 
one  needs  to  limit  the  sample  to  firms  who  respond  to 
consecutive surveys.  Table 3 presents detailed data for the 
322 firms who answered both the March and June 2007 
surveys.  Of these firms, 43 percent said they changed prices 
in March and 47 percent said they changed prices in June.     
These outcomes are similar to the number of firms reporting 
a selling price change in the full sample, 44 percent (see 
table 1). The results in table 1, however, do not disclose the 
underlying dynamics seen in table 3.  For example, the table 
shows that 37 percent of firms did not change their prices in 
either the March or June quarters of 2007 while 27 percent 
changed their prices twice.  (See Silverstone 2000 for further 
analysis of these dynamics and related probabilities).  
Figure 2 shows the proportion of firms changing prices at 
least once in a six month period and the producers’ price 
index for outputs (PPO) between 1983 and 2007.  The two 
   The mean and standard deviation for the period 97:-
97:, excluding the price freeze period 9:-9:, 
are  percent and . percent, respectively.  The mean 
and standard deviation for the period 990:-007: are 



































Percentage of matched firms changing prices 





















Source: NZIER Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
series track each other very closely: the correlation over the 
period  1983-2007  is  0.81.  The  high  correlation  between 
these two series is consistent with European evidence that 
the number of firms changing prices is a good predictor of 
changes in the producer price index. 
Question  3:  Are  firms  equally  likely  to  change 
prices?
To explore the frequency with which different firms change 
prices, we examined the responses of firms that replied to 
eight consecutive surveys in the periods ending in the fourth 
quarter of 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006.   
Since firms often miss responding to a survey, this sampling 
procedure  substantially  reduces  the  sample  size  to  1013 
observations. 
Figure 3, and the upper part of table 4, shows the number of 
times firms changed prices during an eight quarter period.   
The mean number of price changes was 2.8 changes every 
eight quarters, or one change every eight and a half months.   
This average, however, disguises a very wide distribution.  At 
one end of the distribution, 35 percent of firms recorded 
one change or fewer every eight quarters, of which half 
recorded no changes. At the other end, 15 percent of firms 
recorded at least six changes in the eight quarters. 
It  is  of  interest  to  know  whether  this  distribution  is 
consistent with the hypothesis that every firm was equally 
likely to change prices.  The simple answer is no.  If every 
firm were equally likely to change prices each quarter, the 
number of price changes made over eight quarters would 
follow a binomial distribution.  Figure 3 shows this binomial 
distribution  together  with  the  actual  distribution  of  the 
number of changes made by firms.4 The two distributions 
are  clearly  very  different.  Compared  to  the  binomial 
distribution, the actual distribution has more firms changing 
prices very frequently and many more firms changing prices 
very infrequently. The hypothesis that the two distributions 
are the same can be formally rejected at the five percent 
significance  level  using  a  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney  non-
parametric test.5  In broad terms, this distribution is similar 
to results found internationally. 
  The binomial distribution is calculated using a probability 
of change equal  to the fraction of firms that change prices 
each quarter, in this case  percent.
   The  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney  test  tests  whether  the 
cumulative distribution functions of two distributions lie 
above each other. The test statistic has a standard normal 
asymptotic  distribution.  The  test  statistics  comparing 
the two distributions is ., significant at the  percent 
level. 
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The lower part of table 4 shows the length of time since 
a firm last changed its prices.  The table indicates that 35 
percent of firms changed prices in the previous quarter and 
another 17 percent reported that they last changed prices in 
the quarter before that.  In total, 68 percent of firms reported 
they had changed prices at least once in the previous four 
quarters.  Of the remaining 32 percent, 17 percent had not 
reported any price changes in the previous eight quarters. 
It is natural to ask two questions about these latter results.   
First, is it likely that the 17 percent of firms that reported that 
they had not changed prices in the previous eight quarters 
were simply misreporting?  This could be the case.  We think 
it unlikely for two reasons.  First, if one extends the period of 
analysis from eight quarters to ten quarters, one finds that a 
quarter of these firms (4 percent out of 17 percent) changed 
their prices in the additional two quarters.  This fraction is 
similar to the fraction of respondents that reported they last 
changed seven or eight quarters ago, suggesting a natural 
decay process.  Secondly, only 10 percent of the firms that 
reported no price changes in the previous eight quarters also 
reported no demand changes over the same period. Since 
these  two  questions  are  adjacent  in  the  survey,  it  seems 
unlikely that the respondent firms were simply choosing to 
tick the ‘no change’ boxes in the questionnaire.  
Question 4: Are differences in the frequency with 
which firms change prices related to the size and 
sector of firms? 
To  answer  this  question,  table  5  shows  aspects  of  the 
distribution of price changes for firms in three different size 
categories  in  the  manufacturing  and  building,  merchant 
and service sectors.  The three size categories are firms with 
fewer than 50 employees, firms with 50-200 employees, 
and firms with more than 200 employees. 
Three  results  are  immediately  apparent.  First,  merchants 
change prices more frequently than either manufacturing 
or service firms. This result holds for firms of all sizes and 
therefore does not reflect differences in the size composition 
of sectors.  Second, small firms change prices less frequently 
than medium sized firms, who change prices less frequently 
than large firms. This result holds in each sector, although, as 
discussed below, the differences between medium and large 
firms are not statistically significant.  On average, large firms 
changed prices one more time during every two year period 
than small firms.  Third, there are significant differences in 
price  setting  behaviour  within  each  size-sector  category. 
At least nine percent of each category changed prices very 
frequently and at least another 16 percent changed prices 
very infrequently. 
Closer inspection of the data shows that large firms are twice 
as likely as small firms to change prices very frequently (at least 
six times in eight quarters), but much less likely to change 
prices very infrequently (at most once in eight quarters).  A 
quarter of large firms changed prices nearly every quarter. In 
contrast, over 40 percent of small manufacturing and service 
sector firms, and a third of small merchant firms, changed 
prices at most once in a two year period, of which more 
than half reported no changes. The tendency of small firms 
to change prices less frequently than large firms is found 
in most international studies. Amirault et al. (2004, p.34) 
offer the following explanation. Because many senior staff 
at small firms have numerous tasks in addition to reviewing  Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
and adjusting prices, the administrative and management 
costs associated with the price-setting process are particularly 
onerous and so prices are changed less frequently.  
Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution function of the 
number of price changes made by small, medium and large 
manufacturing  firms.  It  shows  that  large  firms  are  much 
more likely to change prices than small or medium firms.   
For  example,  38  percent  of  large  firms  change  prices  at 
most twice every two years, whereas 50 percent of medium 
firms and 60 percent of small firms change prices at that 
frequency.  The hypothesis that small manufacturing firms 
have the same distribution of price changes as either medium 
or  large  manufacturing  firms  can  be  rejected  at  the  five 
percent significance level using a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
test.6  In contrast, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis 
that medium and large manufacturing firms have different 
distributions at the five percent level. A similar pattern of 
results is found for the merchant and service sectors, namely 
that small firms change prices less frequently than medium 
or large firms, but the differences between medium and 
large firms are smaller and not statistically significant.7 
Question 5: Is there seasonality in the frequency of 
price changes?  
Table 6 shows the seasonal distribution of price changes 
using the 35,600 responses given between 1992 and 2007. 
There is little evidence of a seasonal pattern in the data. The 
number of price changes, expressed as a percentage of total 
replies, is about the same in each quarter, at between eight 
and 10 percent.  This result is also found when the data are 
disaggregated by sector. This outcome could be explained 
partly  by  the  questionnaire  which  asks  respondents  to 
exclude seasonal variations in their replies.  
Question 6: Do firms change prices when costs and 
demand change?
The  above  results  show  the  frequency  with  which  firms 
change prices but do not explain why firms change prices. 
The QSBO data cannot be used to answer question 6 directly 
as firms are not asked why they change prices.  The data 
can be used indirectly, however, as firms are asked whether 
or not they have faced cost or demand changes. We apply 
regression analysis to determine if firms change prices when 
they experience demand or cost changes. 
The approach adopted here was first used by Buckle and 
Carlson (2000a, b) in their analysis of the QSBO data. Like 
   The test statistics comparing the small and medium size 
firms is .0, significant at the  percent level. The test 
statistic for the small and large firms is ., significant 
at the  percent level. The test statistic for the medium 
and  large  firms  is  .7,  significant  at  the  0  percent 
level.
Figure 4
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7   The  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney  statistics  for  merchants 
are: small-medium .7, small large .70 and medium 
large 0..  The statistics for service firms are small-
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them, we estimate an ordered probit model that relates a 
firm’s likelihood of changing prices in a particular quarter to 
changes in cost and demand conditions.  We assume that a 
firm has a desired or target price. The firm adjusts its actual 
price to this value whenever the gap between its actual price 
and its target price becomes too large or, to put differently, 
whenever this gap exceeds a certain threshold.  The price 
gap of the ith firm, denoted, p1
* depends on various factors 
facing the firm including changes in its cost structure and 
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c- are dummy variables indicating whether or not 
a firm had a positive or negative cost change, and Di
d+ and 
Di
d- are dummy variables indicating whether or not a firm 
had a positive or negative demand change. The coefficients 
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whenever p* exceeds an upper threshold k+ and to decrease 
prices whenever p* is less than a lower threshold k-.
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The  ordered  probit  regression  estimates  the  parameters   
) , , , , , (
− + − + − + k k
d d c c α α α α ) given the observed pattern of cost, 
demand and price changes and the assumption that e is 
normally distributed. 
We estimate four separate models. First, we estimate the 
model using all firms that responded to any survey between 
1992  and  2007.  There  are  36,255  observations  in  this 
regression.  In the second, we restrict the sample to firms 
that responded to eight consecutive surveys ending in the 
December quarters of 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 
and 2006. There are 1,003 observations in this regression, 
as we only use the December observations.  The last two 
regressions are estimated using two subsets of these data. 
The first subset contains the firms that frequently adjusted 
prices, defined as those firms that changed prices at least 
five  times  in  the  previous  seven  quarters.  There  are  185 
firms in this group. The second subset contains the firms 
that infrequently adjusted prices, defined as those firms that 
changed prices at most once in the previous seven quarters. 
There are 394 firms in this group. This split was made as 
firms differ in their tendency to change prices. 
Table 7, overleaf, shows the regression results.  The coefficient 
estimates  and  associated  standard  errors  are  shown, 
together with a “marginal probability” measure indicating 
how a cost or demand change increases the likelihood that 
prices will be changed in the same direction. The “marginal 
probability” measures are best interpreted by considering 
an example from the first regression. The coefficient on the 
increase cost dummy Dc+ is 0.74 and the upper threshold 
k+ is 0.98.  If there was no change in costs, the firm would 
increase prices whenever the term e exceeded 0.98, that is, 
16 percent of the time. If there was an increase in costs, 
the firm would increase prices whenever e exceeded 0.24, 
that is, 41 percent of the time. A cost increase, therefore, 
increases the probability of increasing prices by 41-16 = 24 
percent (these percentages have been rounded). 
The results in table 7 are consistent with the main findings 
of  international  surveys  and  the  earlier  work  of  Buckle 
and  Carlson  (2000b).    Firms  are  more  likely  to  increase 
prices  when  costs  increase  than  to  reduce  them  when 
costs decrease.  Firms are also more likely to reduce prices 
when  demand  decreases  than  to  increase  prices  when 
demand increases.  The latter asymmetry is large. In the first 
regression, analysing the behaviour of all firms, an increase 
in demand only increased the probability of increasing prices 
by four percent, whereas a decrease in demand increased the 
probability of reducing prices by 16 percent.  In the remaining 
regressions, an increase in demand was estimated to slightly 
reduce the probability of increasing prices, although these 
estimates  were  not  statistically  significant.    In  these  last 
cases,  however,  a  decrease  in  demand  was  estimated  to 
increase the probability of reducing prices by between 13  Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
percent (for firms that changed prices infrequently) and 24 
percent (for firms that changed prices frequently).
A comparison of the first two regressions shows that the 
results for the firms that only answered eight consecutive 
quarters are broadly consistent with the results for the firms 
that answered any survey.  In both cases, a positive cost 
change increased the probability of an increase in prices by 
approximately a quarter, while a negative demand change 
increased the probability of reducing prices by approximately 
15 percent. In addition, they both have a small response to 
positive demand changes and a somewhat larger response to 
negative demand changes. Since these results are so similar, 
there is no obvious reason to suspect that the small sample 
results for the firms that frequently or infrequently adjust 
prices are not representative of the results for all firms. 
4   Conclusions 
The  results  of  this  exploration  of  price-setting  behaviour 
in  New  Zealand  are  in  line  with  the  results  of  recent 
international  studies.  Four  aspects  stand  out.  First,  there 
is considerable diversity in the frequency with which firms 
adjust prices. About a sixth of firms in the sample adjusted 
prices nearly every quarter, while a third had adjusted prices 
at most once every two years. Small firms are more reluctant 
to change prices than others. Second, firms change prices 
more in response to cost changes than demand changes. 
Third,  firms  seem  to  respond  more  to  negative  demand 
changes than to positive demand changes. In this regard, 
it is noticeable that the two episodes of widespread price 
reduction that occurred in the last twenty years occurred 
during economic downturns. Fourth, firms are more likely 
to have reported price increases rather than price decreases. 
Since 2000, for example, firms were three times as likely to 
report price increases as price decreases.  
The most original finding of the article relates the propensity 
to change prices in response to cost and demand changes 
to a firm’s prior history of price changes. Not surprisingly, 
firms that have a history of changing prices are much more 
likely to respond quickly to changes in cost and demand 
conditions than firms that only occasionally change prices. 
Previously, findings of this type have been indirect, based 9 Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
on the tendency of large firms or firms in the distribution 
sector to change prices more often than other firms. This 
paper has been able to exploit the longitudinal nature of the 
QSBO data to make the link explicit. It seems that some firms 
of all sizes and in all sectors adjust prices infrequently and 
these firms are slow to adjust prices in response to changing 
economic conditions. 
For a long time, central banks have understood that the 
speed  that  firms  adjust  prices  is  a  crucial  factor  behind 
the effectiveness of and costliness of monetary policy. The 
growing body of international research has shed new light on 
aspects of the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy, 
particularly the length of time it can take before changes in 
monetary policy affect the inflation rate. So far, this research 
has not provided central banks with a blueprint to “fine-
tune” monetary policy to take account of the differential 
speed that different firms adjust prices. Nonetheless, there 
is  growing  recognition  that  greater  knowledge  of  the 
reasons why firms change prices could assist central banks 
as they implement monetary policy. For instance, a better 
understanding  of  the  asymmetric  adjustment  by  firms  to 
positive and negative demand shocks may provide a better 
guide  to  the  operation  of  monetary  policy  in  economic 
downturns. 
Directions for further research
Internationally, it is becoming clear that better use could be 
made of firm-level survey data to analyse behaviour. This is 
due partly to software and econometric advances and partly 
to those researchers, such as Blinder et al. (1991, 1998), who 
have urged economists to include surveys and interviews in 
their analysis.  While the Bank monitors the QSBO survey 
and  also  conducts  regular  interviews  with  New  Zealand 
businesses as part of its monitoring of the economy, there 
has been relatively little attempt to build and use statistical 
models using firm-level responses from these surveys.
In this article, we have attempted to show that the firm-
level responses in the QSBO can provide important insights 
into  price-setting  behaviour  in  New  Zealand.  Our  initial 
conclusions  have  been  based  on  the  survey  responses 
of  manufacturers,  builders,  merchants  and  services  to 
the  questions  about  selling  prices,  costs,  demand  and 
employment.  We have not used the responses to any of 
the other survey questions relating, for example, to profit, 
business confidence, recruitment, investment approvals and 
constraints.  Neither have we used the responses from the 
QSBO  sector-specific  questionnaires  relating  to  principal 
activity, capacity utilisation, productivity, stocks, export sales 
and overseas orders.   
The  responses  to  these  other  survey  questions  should 
enable  us  not  only  to  test  the  robustness  of  our  initial 
conclusions but also to allow us to consider a wide range 
of questions. For example: Are firms backward or forward-
looking regarding their own price-setting behaviour?  Do 
they respond to cost and demand changes with a delay? 
What is the relationship, if any, between price changes and 
profitability, output, employment and business confidence?   
Can  our  understanding  of  the  changes  in  the  inflation 
process  in  New  Zealand  as  described,  for  example,  in 
Hodgetts (2006), be enhanced by an understanding of firm-
level price changes? The answers to these questions and 
others may help us better understand how firms respond to 
shocks and thus how monetary policy may be implemented 
optimally. 
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1  Introduction
On 31 July 2006, the Reserve Bank issued smaller, lighter 50, 
20 and 10 cent coins and announced that on 1 November 
2006 the existing 50, 20, 10 and 5 cent coins of cupro-nickel 
composition  would  no  longer  be  legal  tender.1  For  three 
months, the two alternative sets of coins were in circulation 
and could be used to pay for goods and services.
This  unique  situation  brought  into  rare  focus  the  arcane 
but important concept of legal tender. While legal tender 
underpins literally millions of ordinary payment transactions 
that take place daily and therefore supports the functioning 
of the economy at its most basic level – the exchange of 
goods and services for money – it is a concept that is taken 
for granted and frequently misunderstood. This article uses 
the coin change-over as an opportunity to briefly explore the 
legal theory that underpins legal tender and the continuing 
relevance of the concept.
2  Legal tender in theory2
The concept of legal tender in New Zealand is enacted by 
section 27 of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989. 
This section gives an exclusive benefit to the currency issued 
by the Reserve Bank, as follows:
Legal tender
(1)  Every bank note issued, or deemed to be issued, under 
this Act shall be a legal tender for the amount expressed 
in the note.
(2)  A tender of payment of money, to the extent that it is 
made in coins issued, or deemed to be issued, under this 
Act, shall be a legal tender,-
(a)  In the case of coins of a denomination of $10 or 
more, for the payment of any amount:
(b)  In the case of coins of a denomination of $1 or more 
but less than $10, for the payment of any amount 
not exceeding $100:
(c)  In the case of coins of the denomination of 5 cents 
or more, but less than $1, for the payment of an 
amount not exceeding $5:
(d)  In the case of any coins of the denomination of less 
than 5 cents, for the payment of an amount not 
exceeding 20 cents.
(3)  The references to coins and bank notes in subsections 
(1) and (2) of this section do not include references to 
coins and bank notes that have been called in.
However, the Act does not say what ‘legal tender‘ actually 
means and ‘legal tender‘ is commonly confused with the 
related concept of ‘payment‘. In fact, to offer to pay for 
goods with legal tender is not the same as actually paying 
for  them,  and  an  offer  of  legal  tender  does  not  always 
conclude a payment obligation. 
During  the  coin  change-over,  when  two  sets  of  same-
denomination coins were in circulation for three months, 
a  situation  that  faced  many  consumers  and  sellers  was 
whether a seller had to accept payment for goods in the 
‘old‘ cupronickel coins. A number of sellers were reluctant 
to do so and put up signs in their shops to inform consumers 
that they would only accept the ‘new‘ coins.
Payments and the concept of legal tender 
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Some consumers were displeased by that and disputed the 
validity of the signs. Their argument was that they had the 
right to pay in the old coins on the basis that the old coins 
were legal tender. It was typically asserted that ‘legal tender 
means that payment has been made legally‘.
The actual legal situation was more complex and hinged on 
the legal distinction between tender and payment, and was 
fact-dependent to the extent that it could be determined 
whether  the  consumer  and  seller  had  concluded  a  sales 
contract  before  or  after  the  old  coins  were  tendered  in 
payment.
The distinctions are as follows: ‘tender‘ refers to an act of the 
consumer to take steps to complete the payment required to 
conclude a contract, such as to offer old coins as means of 
paying the agreed price for goods in order to complete their 
side of a sales contract. It is a unilateral act of the debtor.
‘Payment‘ is a bilateral act requiring the consent of both 
the consumer and the seller, ie, it is the offer of old coins 
tendered by the consumer and its acceptance by the seller, 
thus fulfilling that particular term of the sales contract.
These  concepts  only  have  relevance  in  the  context  of  a 
contract, in which payment by the consumer is one of the 
terms. In this article we are referring to sales contracts (but 
the principles obviously apply more widely to other types of 
contracts). The conclusion of a sales contract creates a debt 
on the part of a consumer which is fulfilled by payment of 
the agreed price. 
The  consumer  (or  ‘debtor‘  at  this  point)  having  incurred 
the debt may tender payment for it. For example, they may 
offer ‘legal tender‘ in notes or coins under current issue by 
the Reserve Bank.3 Between 31 July and 1 November 2006 
they had a choice of offering old or new coins. However, as 
explained above, offering legal tender does not mean that 
payment has technically been made – only tendered.
The  important  point  here  is  that  the  seller  is  under  no 
positive legal duty to accept the payment that is tendered 
by the debtor. The statement that ‘legal tender means that 
payment has been made‘ is, in technical terms, incorrect. 
So what is the relevance of legal tender? Most consumers 
would naturally assume that having offered valid notes and 
coins they have done all that could reasonably be expected 
of them to meet their side of the bargain. 
The answer has greater theoretical than practical relevance. 
While the seller (‘creditor‘ at this point) is not required to 
accept the payment, the fact that a valid tender has been 
made means that in refusing to accept it, the seller is barred 
from recovering the debt in court. Therefore, in practical 
terms, the creditor has little choice but to accept the legal 
tender payment. 
3  The relevance of legal tender 
in practice
The principles above can now be applied to retrospectively 
resolve the dilemma that faced consumers and sellers during 
the  coin  change-over  between  31  July  and  1  November 
2006. The situation typically brought to the Bank’s attention 
was a sale of goods taking place in a shop.
If a consumer offered to pay for the goods with ‘old coins‘, 
which were still valid legal tender, the seller did not have 
to accept the tender. As long as there was no concluded 
sales contract at that point and therefore no debt owed by 
the consumer, the consumer would have had no legal or 
practical means of unilaterally settling the transaction.
However,  if  a  sales  contract  had  been  concluded  –  for 
example,  the  consumer  had  been  allowed  possession  of 
the goods and owed the price, or had consumed the goods 
before paying (eg a restaurant meal) – then a debt would 
be owed by the consumer to the seller. The consumer may 
settle the obligation with legal tender: old or new coins. If 
they offered old coins the seller could refuse to accept them, 
but as discussed earlier, they would then be left with no 
legal remedy to enforce payment.
While these situations are interesting in order to illustrate 
the concepts of legal tender and payment, and to apply 
them  in  a  unique  situation,  in  reality  the  legal  issues 
   Bear in mind the limitations on legal tender imposed by 
s 7(): eg by virtue of s 7()(c) offering to pay a price 
of $0 in 0 cent pieces would not be a valid tender of 
the price; the debtor would not have performed their 
contractual commitment to pay the contract price in this 
case. Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
were not important during the coin change-over.   This is 
because consumers and sellers dealt with the issues in a 
practical way based on their common desire to complete 
the transaction.4 Fine legal distinctions were not pertinent to 
those motivations, and with little detriment the buyer could 
easily walk away from the transaction if their payment in 
old coins was unacceptable. Alternatively, the seller could 
change its mind and accept the new coins in the knowledge 
that the coins could be re-used for value. 
In addition, the sums involved where payment is made in legal 
tender of coins were far too trivial for any party to consider 
resolving the issues by resorting to the legal position. The 
issues in this context are really only of theoretical, and now 
historical, interest.
However, it is interesting to apply the principles discussed 
here to a far more substantial transaction - for example, the 
settlement of a large commercial deal, perhaps running into 
millions of dollars. Do section 27 of the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand Act and the principles discussed above allow such a 
deal to be settled in cash?
To assume on the basis of section 27 (2)(a) that the answer 
is 'yes' would be to misread the section. While section 27 
provides what is legal tender, it does not say that payment 
must be in legal tender or that any payment in legal tender is 
sufficient for the debtor to meet their payment obligations.
The actual form of payment – whether it is by legal tender 
or some other method – is determined by the contractual 
context.  A  contractual  provision  may  specify  the  form 
of  payment  as  something  other  than  legal  tender.    For 
example, it may specify that payment be made electronically 
or by cheque, in which case the debtor has no right to insist 
on payment in legal tender. With small sums and routine 
transactions, contracts are frequently silent on this matter 
and payment in cash is not considered unreasonable.
With  large  sums,  where  the  contract  is  unspecific  as  to 
the  form  of  payment  the  courts  are  likely  to  conclude 
that  payment  by  legal  tender  is,  in  the  words  of  one 
author  “unthinkable  and  cannot  possibly  be  within  the 
contemplation of the parties”.5 This is because the courts 
will take into account the commercial context in which the 
transaction takes place and the practical difficulties faced by 
the creditor who must count out very large sums of cash. 
Professor Roy Goode makes a similar remark.6
‘In describing the legal characteristics of physical money we 
have  made  reference  to  one  that  is  generally  considered 
to be of fundamental importance, namely the right of the 
creditor to be paid in legal tender, that is, bank notes and 
coins which meet the statutory requirements for legal tender. 
This is no doubt true in the case of small transactions where 
payment of legal tender would be a reasonable method of 
payment; it is undeniably false in the case of transactions 
of any size, where in the absence of a clear agreement for 
payment in legal tender it would be absurd to suppose that 
this was the method of payment intended by the parties.‘
4  Conclusion
This article has drawn upon practical, but unusual, scenarios 
to illustrate the concept of legal tender.  Legal tender is a 
tender of payment that, by law, cannot effectively be refused 
in settlement of a debt denominated in the same currency. 
Without the concept of legal tender cash transactions could 
not  always  take  place  with  sufficient  certainty  to  satisfy 
the  needs  of  consumers  and  sellers.  The  enactment  into 
law of the concept also supports and reinforces the issue 
of currency by the state by guaranteeing its currency has 
an exclusive legal status that is good to settle debts. These 
benefits are largely taken for granted.
On the other hand, the practical limitations of legal tender 
should be acknowledged. It is always subject to the intention 
of the parties, who may contract to receive payment in other 
than legal tender. For larger transactions, the courts would be 
likely to presume that the parties did not contemplate legal 
tender. And where disputes arise over payment, members of 
   Proctor, pp -.
   Goode (00), p .
   For instance although a retailer’s sign warning that ‘old 
coins’ would not be accepted might have had dubious 
legal validity when it came to disputed payments for a 
debt already incurred, it had the practical advantage of 
persuading consumers carrying old coins to take their 
business elsewhere thus preventing such disputes arising 
in the first place.  Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
the public are likely to rely on pragmatic solutions, while the 
formal rules underlying legal tender would rarely have any 
bearing on the outcome. 
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DISCUSSION PAPERS
DP2007/10
Understanding  the  New  Zealand  current 
account: a structural approach
Anella Munro and Rishab Sethi, July 2007
In  this  paper  we  use  a  small  open  economy  model  to 
identify the causal factors that drive New Zealand’s current 
account.  The  model  features  nonseparable  preferences, 
habit in consumption, imperfect capital mobility, permanent 
productivity shocks, fiscal shocks and two foreign shocks to 
explore features that are important in understanding the 
dynamics of the current account. The results suggest that 
permanent  technology  shocks  and  world  cost  of  capital 
shocks  account  for  the  bulk  of  variation  in  the  current 
account  at  short  horizons;  at  longer  horizons,  external 
valuation shocks (reflecting terms of trade and exchange rate 
developments) account for most of the variance. Habit in 
consumption and a debt-sensitive risk premium are features 
that improve overall model it as measured by posterior odds 
ratios. These features, and the contribution of foreign and 
permanent technology shocks, help to explain why the one 
shock present value model of the current account fails to 
appropriately characterise the dynamics of the New Zealand 
current account, as discussed in Munro and Sethi (2006).
DP2007/11
Credit constraints and housing markets in New 
Zealand
Andrew Coleman, July 2007 
The  paper  develops  an  overlapping  generations  model 
incorporating a realistic depiction of the credit constraints 
facing  home  buyers  to  explain  why  home  ownerships 
rates have declined in New Zealand since 1990 despite a 
significant relaxation of credit constraints. The model focuses 
attention on the role of property investors in the property 
market, and suggests changes in credit constraints mainly 
affect the tenure decisions of individual households, but not 
the aggregate level of house prices. The model suggests the 
decline in real interest rates is likely to be the cause of the 
rise in house prices and the decline in home ownership rates 
since 1990.
DP2007/12
Housing  Markets  and  Migration  in  New 
Zealand, 1962-2006
Andrew Coleman and John Landon-Lane, September 
2007 
This paper uses a structural vector autoregression model to 
analyse the relationship between migration flows, housing 
construction and house prices in New Zealand. It shows that a 
net immigration flow equal to one percent of the population 
is associated with an approximately 10 percent increase in 
house prices. This size of this relationship, which has existed 
since the 1960s, is an order of magnitude larger than would 
be  expected  from  the  average  change  in  the  population 
and house prices in the long term. One explanation is that 
migration flows occur at times when locals are changing their 
demand for housing because of revised expectations about 
future income growth. A second explanation is that migrant 
flows  have  a  destabilising  effect  on  agents  expectations 
about the fundamental value of houses. While the paper 
cannot satisfactorily distinguish between these two options, 
the results suggest that monetary policy can still be used to 
dampen the house price changes that occur at times when 
migration flows are unusually large.
DP2007/13
An  analysis  of  the  informational  content  of 
New Zealand data releases: the importance of 
business opinion surveys
by Troy Matheson, September 2007
We examine the informational content of New Zealand data 
releases using a parametric dynamic factor model estimated 
with unbalanced real-time panels of quarterly data. The data 
are categorised into 21 different release blocks, allowing us 
to make 21 different factor model forecasts each quarter. 
We compare three of these factor model forecasts for real 
GDP growth, CPI inflation, non-tradable CPI inflation, and 
tradable CPI inflation with real-time forecasts made by the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand each quarter. We find that, 
at some horizons, the factor model produce forecasts of  Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
similar accuracy to the Reserve Bank’s forecasts. Analysing 
the  marginal  value  of  each  of  the  data  releases  reveals 
the importance of the business opinion survey data – the 
Quarterly Survey of Business Opinion and the National Bank’s 
Business Outlook survey – in determining how factor model 
predictions, and the uncertainty around those predictions, 
evolves through each quarter.
DP2007/14
Which nonlinearity in the Phillips curve? The 
absence of accelerating deflation in Japan
by Emmanuel De Veirman, September 2007
It is standard to model the output-inflation trade-off as a 
linear  relationship  with  a  time-invariant  slope.  We  assess 
empirical  evidence  for  three  types  of  nonlinearity  in  the 
short-run Phillips curve. At an empirical level, we aim to 
discover why large negative output gaps in Japan during the 
period 1998-2002 did not lead to accelerating deflation, but 
instead coincided with stable, albeit moderately negative, 
inflation. We document that this episode is most convincingly 
interpreted as reflecting a gradual flattening of the Phillips 
curve. Our analysis sheds light on the determinants of the 
time-variation in the Phillips curve slope. Our results suggest 
that, in any economy where trend inflation is substantially 
lower (or substantially higher) today than in past decades, 
time-variation in the slope of the short-run Phillips curve has 
become too important to ignore.7 Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
NEWS RELEASES
Hugh  Fletcher  reappointed  to  Reserve  Bank 
Board
27 June 2007
The  Minister  of  Finance  announced  today  that  Mr  Hugh 
Fletcher had been reappointed to Board of the Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand. Mr Fletcher will serve a further a further 
five year term, expiring in June 2012, as a non-executive 
director.
The  primary  role  of  the  Board  is  to  monitor  and  review 
the performance of the Reserve Bank, and the Governor, 
in the delivery of its monetary policy objectives and other 
responsibilities. Mr Fletcher is currently Chair of the board 
of directors of IAG New Zealand and a board director of 
Fletcher Building, and has a number of other private and 
voluntary sector board appointments.
Reserve Bank issues Statement of Intent
3 July 2007
The Reserve Bank has released its Statement of Intent (SOI) 
for 2007-2010.
Reserve Bank Governor Alan Bollard said the SOI reflects 
the Bank’s undertaking in its five-year Funding Agreement 
to renew its tools and systems to ensure it can deliver on 
its policy and operational goals in the face of significant 
change.
“As we have noted on a number of occasions, we are facing 
a challenging environment,” Dr Bollard said. “We have seen 
the  longest  period  of  growth  since  1968-75;  the  lowest 
unemployment rate in 20 years; sustained high commodity 
prices,  especially  for  dairy;  unprecedented  access  to 
international credit; and worldwide booms in housing and 
oil prices.
  “The  outcomes  have  surprised  forecasters  and  markets. 
New Zealand households have taken to borrowing, investing 
in houses and general consumption to an extent never seen 
before.
 “We are continuing to invest in upgrading our forecasting 
and policy tools, improving our understanding of household 
balance sheets, and improving the quality of our statistics. 
We have also reviewed and offered advice to Government on 
whether other tools could assist us in managing inflation.”
Dr Bollard said the Bank is strengthening its analysis of risk 
in the financial sector. Its programme of systems renewal 
continues in this SOI: back-office systems that support the 
Bank’s functions, such as the payments system, forecasting 
and  data  systems,  web  capability,  financial  reporting, 
document management.
40th Anniversary of Decimalisation
10 July 2007
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand today marked the 40th 
anniversary of currency decimalisation.
Forty  years  ago  on  the  10th  of  July  1967  New  Zealand 
replaced pounds, shillings and pence with decimal currency.
Reserve Bank Head of Currency Alan Boaden said the idea 
of switching New Zealand to decimal currency was raised 
in 1933 by the New Zealand Numismatic Society. “The idea 
was rejected at the time because of the cost, and - funnily 
enough - because there was a thought that the imperial 
fractions were easier for most people to handle.
 “The idea did not go away, however, and there was further 
talk of decimalisation in the 1950s. In 1957 the Government 
set up a special committee to investigate; the idea fell on 
fertile  ground,  and  in  1963  the  Government  decided  to 
decimalise  -  setting  the  change  over,  dubbed  ‘Decimal 
Currency’ (DC) day, for 10 July 1967.
 “A great deal of work was required to make the change, 
including  a  huge  publicity  campaign.  There  were  public 
discussions  over  what  the  new  decimal  money  might  be 
called. Words such as ‘kiwi’ and ‘zeal’ were proposed to 
avoid confusion with ‘dollar’, which most people at the time 
associated with American money,” said Mr Boaden.
Mr Boaden said in the end, though, the word ‘dollar’ was 
selected, and “Mr Dollar’ became the symbol of transition.
To celebrate the 40th anniversary the Reserve Bank museum 
in Wellington will be hosting, with the help of Westpac’s 
Archives,  a  James  Berry  exhibition  from  16  July  until  26 
October 2007. Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
James Berry was commissioned in 1966 to produce designs 
for all the coins. Over the years the designs on New Zealand’s 
coins have changed but Berry’s ten and fifty cent coin designs 
remain in use today.
Reserve  Bank  announces  changes  to  FX 
management
13 July 2007
The Reserve Bank today announced changes to its financing 
and  management  of  New  Zealand’s  foreign  currency 
reserves.
The  moves  arise  from  a  review  of  the  Bank’s  balance 
sheet, announced in its Statement of Intent in June 2006. 
The  review  was  aimed  at  enabling  the  Bank  to  manage 
its balance sheet to best meet monetary policy, currency, 
liquidity management and foreign reserves requirements.
Reserve Bank Governor Alan Bollard said that for the last 
20 years, the Bank’s foreign currency assets have been fully 
matched by foreign currency liabilities.
 “That was an unusual approach by international standards 
and  we  are  now  moving  in  the  direction  of  a  more 
conventional approach,” Dr Bollard said.
In the future we will hold some portion of our foreign reserves 
on an unhedged basis - an “open FX” position. This means 
that part of the foreign reserves portfolio will be funded in 
New Zealand dollars rather than in foreign currencies.”
Dr Bollard said that the main reason for this new approach 
to foreign exchange (FX) management is to give the Bank 
a more effective means of responding to crisis situations 
involving sharp falls in the NZ dollar.
 “In crisis situations it is of paramount importance that the 
Bank  retains  access  to  foreign  currency  reserves.  With  a 
portion of our reserves no longer borrowed from abroad, 
but funded internally, we will become less dependent on 
international capital markets in times of crisis.
 “Also, the use of unhedged reserves in this situation will be 
less costly and give rise to less additional risk than would be 
the case using hedged reserves. Unhedged foreign reserves 
provide a more effective form of insurance against a currency 
crisis.”
The Bank’s guidelines for operating in the foreign exchange 
market have also been modified. Overt intervention intended 
to  affect  the  exchange  rate  directly  may  still  occur.  In 
addition, the Bank will be able to more gradually accumulate 
or reduce its foreign exchange position when the exchange 
rate is at extreme levels and unjustified by medium-term 
economic fundamentals.
Dr Bollard said that the Bank’s more passive FX transactions 
will  not  necessarily  be  expected  to  directly  affect  the 
exchange rate.
 “However, such transactions will allow the Bank to give 
concrete signals regarding the extent to which the exchange 
rate is seen as over- or under-valued. That may indirectly 
affect the exchange rate by discouraging speculators from 
pushing the currency to extreme levels.”
Because the interest rates on the Bank’s New Zealand dollar 
borrowings are higher than on foreign currency borrowing, 
the annual cost of holding foreign reserves is expected to 
increase somewhat with the change in approach.
The increased open FX position on the Bank’s balance sheet 
is also expected to result in greater variability in the Bank’s 
net income, as a result of foreign exchange gains and losses. 
However, the Bank’s foreign exchange positions could be 
expected  to  be  profitable  on  average  over  the  medium 
term.
The Bank has been using and will continue to use its FX 
market operations to lift the level of its unhedged reserves 
towards a new long-run average level. The Bank publishes 
its open foreign exchange position monthly on its website, 
with a lag of one month.
Background documents on this new policy are available on 
the Reserve Bank and New Zealand Treasury’s websites:
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/finmarkets/foreignreserves/
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/release/rbnzeri/9 Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
Reserve Bank raises OCR to 8.25 percent
26 July 2007
The Official Cash Rate (OCR) will increase by 25 basis points 
to 8.25 percent.
Reserve Bank Governor Alan Bollard said: “The New Zealand 
economy is running strong. We are recording continued big 
increases in international commodity prices, especially dairy, 
reflecting solid world demand for our products.
 “This is very good news for New Zealand. Given this positive 
situation,  some  of  the  negative  commentary  circulating 
about the economy is unwarranted.
“However, the continued tight labour market, high capacity 
use, and rising oil and food prices all point to sustained 
inflationary  pressures.  That  is  why  we  are  increasing  the 
OCR today.
  “The  New  Zealand  dollar  has  reached  very  high  levels 
recently, driven by US dollar weakness and New Zealanders’ 
heavy demand for borrowing. This level of the currency has 
been hurting exports.
 “The high New Zealand dollar is not sustainable medium 
term and investors should understand this. The higher OCR 
now gives strong incentives to New Zealanders to save.
  “New  Zealanders  have  been  showing  early  signs  of 
moderating their borrowing.
Provided they keep this up, and the pressure on resources 
continues to ease, we think the four successive OCR increases 
we have delivered will be sufficient to contain inflation.”
RBNZ MPS and OCR dates for 2008
3 August 2007
The following is the Reserve Bank’s schedule for the release 
of  its  quarterly  Monetary  Policy  Statements  and  Official 
Cash Rate announcements for 2008. Each Monetary Policy 
Statement  includes  within  it  an  OCR  announcement,  so, 
as usual, in total there will be eight OCR announcements 
during 2008. Each announcement will be made at 9.00 am 
on the day concerned.
24 January  OCR announcement
6 March    Monetary Policy Statement
24 April    OCR announcement
5 June    Monetary Policy Statement
24 July    OCR announcement
11 September  Monetary Policy Statement
23 October  OCR announcement
4 December  Monetary Policy Statement
The Reserve Bank reserves the right to make changes to this 
schedule, if required due to unexpected developments. In 
that unlikely event, the markets and the media will be given 
as much warning as possible.
National finalists announced in Reserve Bank 
Monetary Policy Challenge
9 August 2007
The Reserve Bank announced today the six secondary schools 
that have made it through to the national final of the 2007 
Monetary Policy Challenge (MPC).
All  national  finalists  were  selected  from  56  schools  that 
competed  in  regional  finals  from  30  July  to  6  August. 
Regional finals were held in Auckland, Hamilton, Wellington, 
Christchurch and Dunedin. Two economists from the Reserve 
Bank were judges.
The national finalists are: Avondale College and Kristin Senior 
School from the Auckland regional final; New Plymouth Girls’ 
High  School  from  the  Waikato  regional  final:  Lindisfarne 
College from the Wellington regional final; Burnside High 
School  from  the  Christchurch  regional  final;  and  Timaru 
Boys’ High School from the Southern Region regional final. 
All winning team members will receive a $50 book voucher 
and certificate in recognition of their achievement.
Judges were impressed with the level of comprehension each 
winning team demonstrated in their written submission and 
oral presentation. “Their ability to take the economic theory 
they had learned in the classroom and apply it to a real-world 
situation took a great deal of skill,” they commented.0 Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
The  MPC  is  designed  to  expand  senior  secondary  school 
economics students’ understanding of monetary policy and 
links to NCEA achievement standards.
Just like economists working in the Reserve Bank, each team 
analyses the economic conditions facing New Zealand and 
the outlook for inflation. On the basis of that analysis, they 
decide on an appropriate setting for the Official Cash Rate 
(the Reserve Bank’s interest rate). Each team presents the 
reasons for their decision in a written submission and, if 
selected as a regional finalist, an oral presentation.
Acting  Reserve  Bank  Governor  Grant  Spencer  said:  “The 
Challenge  gets  students  thinking  about  how  the  New 
Zealand economy works, what influences it and the impacts 
of economic policy. It confronts students with the difficulties 
and considerations involved in a decision-making process.”
The  national  final  takes  place  at  the  Reserve  Bank  in 
Wellington on Wednesday, 22 August. The winning team 
will receive $2,500 for their school and will be invited back 
to the Reserve Bank on 13 September 2007 to watch the 
Governor announce the Monetary Policy Statement.
Reserve Bank Monitoring Financial Markets
16 August 2007
Reserve  Bank  Acting  Governor  Grant  Spencer  said  today 
that the Reserve Bank is closely following developments in 
the financial markets, both domestically and offshore.
 “Following the recent disruptions in global credit markets, 
the Reserve Bank has been closely monitoring the impact 
on the domestic markets and liquidity conditions,” said Mr 
Spencer.
  “While  some  additional  pressures  have  been  present, 
we believe the level of cash within the banking system is 
adequate and markets continue to function satisfactorily.
 “The Bank will continue to monitor conditions closely and 
stands ready to provide additional liquidity should that be 
necessary,” Mr Spencer concluded.
Reserve  Bank  Head  of  Human  Resources 
appointed
20 August 2007
The  Reserve  Bank  today  announced  the  appointment  of 
Lindsay Jenkin as the Bank’s Head of Human Resources.
Ms Jenkin brings with her a wealth of experience to the role, 
having worked in a number of human resource positions 
including a senior consulting role with Hewitt Associates and 
13 years as Human Resources Director for Colgate-Palmolive 
Ltd.
This move follows the appointment of the former Head of 
Human  Resources,  Tanya  Harris,  to  the  position  of  Chief 
Information Officer at the Bank.
Ms  Jenkin  takes  up  her  appointment  on  24  September 
2007.
RBNZ to accept NZ bank paper in repo facility
23 August 2007
As stated on 16 August, the Reserve Bank has continued 
to closely monitor the impact of global market disorder on 
developments in the domestic financial markets.
Reserve  Bank  Deputy  Governor,  Grant  Spencer,  said: 
“Pressures have persisted over the past week warranting 
steps to ease liquidity conditions in the interbank market.
“As a temporary measure the Bank will now accept NZ bank 
bills in its overnight reverse repurchase facility, at a cost of 
OCR + 100 basis points.
“This change will commence from 24 August 2007.”
Mr Spencer added, “At the same time the Reserve Bank will 
introduce  its  previously  announced  Exchange  Settlement 
Account  tiering  regime  which  was  due  to  be  introduced 
from 3 September 2007.”
Mr Spencer emphasised: “This measure is aimed solely at 
easing short-term interbank liquidity pressures and has no 
implications for the Bank’s monetary policy stance.”
Operational  details  of  the  facility  can  be  obtained  from 
the  Reserve  Bank’s  website:    http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/
finmarkets/liquiditymanagement/3067314.html Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
National Winners announced in Reserve Bank 
Monetary Policy Challenge
24 August 2007
The  Reserve  Bank  announced  today  that  New  Plymouth 
Girls’ High School is the national winner of the Reserve Bank 
of  New  Zealand  2007  Monetary  Policy  Challenge  (MPC). 
Timaru Boys’ High School placed second in the national final 
and Lindisfarne College from Hawke’s Bay came third.
The  national  final  took  place  at  the  Reserve  Bank  in 
Wellington  on  22  August  and  was  hotly  contested.  Two 
economists from the Reserve Bank were judges.
New  Plymouth  Girl’s  High  School  won  $2,500  in  prize 
money for their school and will visit the Reserve Bank on 
13  September  to  watch  the  announcement  of  the  next 
Monetary Policy Statement by Governor Alan Bollard.
Timaru  Boys’  High  School  won  $1,500  and  Lindisfarne 
College won $750 in prize money for their respective schools. 
The other competitors in the national final were Avondale 
College  (Auckland),  Kristin  Senior  School  (Auckland)  and 
Burnside High School (Christchurch).
Judges said the winning teams demonstrated an exceptional 
level of understanding about the economy. “Their ability to 
apply the economic theory they had learned in the classroom 
to real-world situations was impressive,” they said.
The  MPC  is  designed  to  expand  senior  secondary  school 
economics students’ understanding of monetary policy and 
links to NCEA achievement standards.
Just like economists working in the Reserve Bank, each team 
analyses the economic conditions facing New Zealand and 
the outlook for inflation. On the basis of that analysis, they 
decide on an appropriate setting for the Official Cash Rate 
(the Reserve Bank’s interest rate). Each team presents the 
reasons for their decision in a written submission and, if 
selected as a regional finalist, an oral presentation.
Reserve Bank Governor Alan Bollard said: “The Challenge 
gets students thinking about how the New Zealand economy 
works, what influences it and the impacts of economic policy. 
It confronts students with the difficulties and considerations 
involved in a decision-making process.”
The  MPC  is  open  to  all  New  Zealand  secondary  school 
economics students and runs annually from May to August. 
This  year  over  70  schools  from  Whangarei  to  Invercargill 
entered the competition.
Reserve Bank issues enforcement notice to 
ABN Union Bank Limited
31 August 2007
The Reserve Bank has issued an enforcement notice to ABN 
Union Bank Limited, a company incorporated in the United 
Kingdom.
It is a breach of section 64 the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
Act 1989 to carry on any activity in New Zealand using a 
name that includes the word “bank”, unless the entity using 
the name is a registered bank in New Zealand, or is otherwise 
exempted. If the Reserve Bank is satisfied that a company is 
contravening section 64 of the Act, it is empowered by the 
Act to issue a notice to that company requiring it to take 
specified actions to achieve compliance.
ABN Union Bank Limited is not a registered bank in New 
Zealand, and is not exempted from section 64 of the Act. 
Reserve Bank enquiries show that ABN Union Bank Limited 
has been carrying on activities in New Zealand.
The enforcement notice issued by the Reserve Bank to ABN 
Union  Bank  Limited  requires  it  to  cease  carrying  on  any 
activity in New Zealand using a name that includes the word 
“bank”.
Reserve Bank welcomes new deposit-taker 
requirements
12 September 2007
Reserve Bank Governor Alan Bollard today welcomed the 
Cabinet  decision  for  the  Bank  to  be  the  new  prudential 
regulator of non-bank deposit-takers.
Under  the  new  arrangements  the  Bank’s  role  will  be  to 
license  deposit-takers,  develop  and  enforce  minimum 
prudential and governance requirements and apply credit 
rating requirements. Trustee corporations will continue to 
be the front-line supervisors of deposit-takers. Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
Dr Bollard said the proposals are expected to provide a more 
consistent approach to the supervision of deposit-takers and 
provide a stronger basis for confidence in the deposit-takers 
sector.  “Improved  disclosure  and  credit  ratings  will  assist 
depositors to make better-informed investment decisions.”
“Credit ratings from reputable rating agencies will play an 
important role in the new regulatory arrangements. Credit 
ratings assist depositors to better appreciate the risk they 
are taking with the matched return when they invest in a 
deposit-taker,” commented Dr Bollard.
The Reserve Bank will engage with stakeholders, including 
deposit-takers and trustees, in developing the regulations 
once the legislation has been enacted. The Bank will also 
assist in the revision and simplification of public disclosure 
requirements for deposit-takers.
Legislation will be introduced into Parliament later this year 
to implement most of the proposals, with further legislation 
being introduced in 2008.
OCR unchanged at 8.25 percent
13 September 2007
The Official Cash Rate (OCR) will remain unchanged at 8.25 
percent.
Reserve Bank Governor Alan Bollard said: “The outlook for 
economic activity and inflation has become more uncertain 
since  we  reviewed  the  OCR  in  July.  Credit  concerns  and 
heightened risk aversion have led to significant turbulence 
in global financial markets. This development increases the 
likelihood  of  a  weaker  economic  outlook  for  the  United 
States and New Zealand’s other key trading partners than 
in recent forecasts.
“The consequences of this financial market turmoil for New 
Zealand remain unclear at this stage. However, we continue 
to expect a significant boost to the economy over the next 
two  years  from  the  sharp  rise  in  world  prices  for  dairy 
products and some other commodities that has occurred 
over the past year. A sharp decline in the New Zealand dollar 
since July, if sustained, will act to reinforce the effects of 
higher world prices on export sector revenues.
“Recent  inflation  outcomes  have  highlighted  widespread 
inflation pressures but indicators in recent weeks suggest 
that previous increases in the OCR are starting to dampen 
domestic spending, which will help to reduce those pressures. 
In particular, household borrowing growth is beginning to 
slow and turnover in the housing market continues to fall.
“We  expect  the  effects  of  stronger  export  revenues  on 
activity and inflation to be broadly offset by a further braking 
effect from the interest rate increases undertaken earlier this 
year. However, in the short term, CPI inflation is likely to 
rise due to the effects of a lower exchange rate and higher 
food prices. It is important that this temporary increase in 
inflation does not affect price- or wage-setting behaviour in 
the medium term.
“The recent collapse of a number of finance companies and 
reduced  liquidity  within  the  non-bank  lending  institution 
sector  generally  could  further  act  to  dampen  activity  in 
some areas of the economy, such as property development 
or consumer financing. However, we currently expect those 
negative effects to be relatively contained.
“At this point, we believe that the current level of the OCR 
is consistent with future inflation outcomes of 1 to 3 percent 
on average over the medium term. However, given greater 
than usual uncertainty at present, we will be watching to 
see how the upside and downside risks to the outlook are 
developing.” Reserve Bank of New Zealand: Bulletin, Vol. 70, No. 3
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